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The page can be embedded in another site

MediumConfirmedQuick winweb.security-headers.no-frame-protection

What this check looks for

Nothing stops another website from loading your page inside an invisible frame and tricking visitors into clicking things they cannot see.

Why it matters

This is clickjacking: your real page, your real session, an attacker's invisible overlay. A visitor thinks they are clicking a video and they are approving a transfer or changing a setting on your site.

When the check passes, your report says: “Other sites are refused permission to frame this page”.

What it costs your score

When this check fails it removes 12 points from your Web security score, before the status, confidence and repeat multipliers are applied. Web security carries a weight of 8 in the overall score.

It shares the web-security.framing family ceiling of 12 points: however many findings that family produces, together they cannot remove more than that from Web security. One underlying problem showing up in several places is still one problem.

Severity
medium
Default confidence
confirmed
Status when triggered
fail
Deduction
12 points
Family cap
web-security.framing · 12
Category
Web security
Module
Web security headers
Fix owned by
user
In the ruleset since
2026.09

How the whole score is calculated

How to fix it

Set CSP frame-ancestors, and X-Frame-Options as a fallback.

Without either, your page can be framed and clicked through invisibly.

  1. Add frame-ancestors 'none' to the CSP if nothing should embed the page.

  2. Use frame-ancestors 'self' https://partner.example to allow specific embedders — ALLOW-FROM does not work, this is its replacement.

  3. Add X-Frame-Options: DENY as well for browsers that do not support frame-ancestors.

How to confirm it worked

  • curl -sSI https://‹host›/ | grep -iE 'x-frame-options|frame-ancestors'

The configuration to publish
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'
X-Frame-Options: DENY

A named slot like ‹domain› — and the braces left in the configuration below — is filled in with your own values when this rule appears on a report.

Remediation by platform

nginx
add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
Apache
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
	Header always set X-Frame-Options "DENY"
</IfModule>
Caddy
header {
	X-Frame-Options "DENY"
}
Cloudflare
Rules → Overview → Create rule → Response Header Transform Rule → Set static → X-Frame-Options = DENY
(Dashboard path as at 2026-09; Cloudflare reorganised these pages and may again.)

  • The always flag matters: without it nginx omits the header on error responses, which are exactly the ones an attacker aims for. Note also that any add_header in a location block discards every add_header inherited from the server block.

  • Shown because the response identified Apache. Put it in the virtual host rather than .htaccess: .htaccess is re-read on every request, and Header always set there runs too late for responses the server generates itself.

  • A Transform Rule adds the header at Cloudflare's edge, so it applies only to responses that reach visitors through Cloudflare. An origin that is reachable directly — by IP, or through a DNS record that is not proxied — still serves the response measured here without it. Setting it at the origin covers both paths.

Technical detail

‹detail›

Two headers govern this and the modern one wins: browsers that support CSP frame-ancestors ignore X-Frame-Options entirely. So frame-ancestors 'none' alone is complete protection, and X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM … is no protection at all — no browser has implemented ALLOW-FROM since it was dropped from the specification. A report-only CSP does not count here either; it enforces nothing.

Standards and references

Test this on your domain

Run the check that produces this finding, on its own, against any domain.

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