SSL 3.0 is enabled

CriticalConfirmedtls.protocols.sslv3-enabled

What this check looks for

The server accepts SSL 3.0, which has been formally prohibited since 2015 and can be attacked to reveal parts of an encrypted session.

Why it matters

POODLE lets an attacker who can sit between a visitor and the site recover secrets such as session cookies, one byte at a time. Leaving SSL 3.0 available is what makes the downgrade to it possible.

When the check passes, your report says: “The server refuses SSL 3.0”.

What it costs your score

When this check fails it removes 50 points from your TLS score, before the status, confidence and repeat multipliers are applied. TLS carries a weight of 15 in the overall score.

It shares the tls.protocols family ceiling of 40 points: however many findings that family produces, together they cannot remove more than that from TLS. One underlying problem showing up in several places is still one problem.

Severity: critical
Default confidence: confirmed
Status when triggered: fail
Deduction: 50 points
Family cap: tls.protocols · 40
Category: TLS
Module: Tls protocols
Fix owned by: user
In the ruleset since: 2026.09

How the whole score is calculated

How to fix it

Disable SSL 3.0.

POODLE is unfixable inside the protocol; the only remedy is to stop offering it.

Set the protocol list to TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only, then reload.

How to confirm it worked

openssl s_client -connect ‹host›:443 -ssl3 </dev/null 2>&1 | tail -1 — expect a failure

A named slot like ‹domain› — and the braces left in the configuration below — is filled in with your own values when this rule appears on a report.

Remediation by platform

nginx

ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384;

Apache

SSLProtocol             -all +TLSv1.2 +TLSv1.3
SSLHonorCipherOrder     off
SSLCipherSuite          ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305

Caddy

‹host› {
	tls {
		protocols tls1.2 tls1.3
	}
}

Cloudflare

SSL/TLS → Edge Certificates → Minimum TLS Version → TLS 1.2.

Put this in the http block so it applies to every server block; a per-server ssl_protocols directive silently overrides it for that server only.
Set it in the main configuration, not in .htaccess — SSLProtocol is a server-context directive and .htaccess cannot change it.
Caddy already defaults to TLS 1.2 and 1.3; an explicit block is only needed to pin them.
This setting governs the connection between visitors and Cloudflare's edge only. It does not change what the origin server negotiates, and an origin that is reachable directly — by IP, or through any DNS record that is not proxied — still accepts what it accepted before. This scan measured the origin, so apply the server-side configuration as well.

Technical detail

An SSL 3.0 handshake succeeded against ‹host›. ‹source›. CVE-2014-3566 (POODLE) exploits SSL 3.0's non-deterministic CBC padding, which cannot be fixed within the protocol — RFC 7568 prohibits SSL 3.0 rather than patching it. TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV limits the downgrade path but is not a substitute for disabling the protocol.