Server accepts a broken cipher suite

HighConfirmedtls.protocols.insecure-cipher

What this check looks for

One of the encryption methods the server agrees to is broken — it can be read, forged, or provides no protection at all.

Why it matters

An attacker who can influence the connection can steer it to the weakest option the server accepts. Offering a broken suite means the strength of every other one no longer sets the floor.

When the check passes, your report says: “Every cipher suite on offer is one still considered safe”.

What it costs your score

When this check fails it removes 30 points from your TLS score, before the status, confidence and repeat multipliers are applied. TLS carries a weight of 15 in the overall score.

It shares the tls.protocols family ceiling of 40 points: however many findings that family produces, together they cannot remove more than that from TLS. One underlying problem showing up in several places is still one problem.

Severity: high
Default confidence: confirmed
Status when triggered: fail
Deduction: 30 points
Family cap: tls.protocols · 40
Category: TLS
Module: Tls protocols
Fix owned by: user
In the ruleset since: 2026.09

How the whole score is calculated

How to fix it

Replace the cipher list with the Mozilla intermediate profile.

A broken suite the server accepts is a suite an attacker can insist on.

Replace the cipher list wholesale rather than removing suites one at a time — a hand-edited list is how these survive.
Reload and re-test.

How to confirm it worked

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 ‹host› — expect no suite graded below A

A named slot like ‹domain› — and the braces left in the configuration below — is filled in with your own values when this rule appears on a report.

Remediation by platform

nginx

ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384;

Apache

SSLProtocol             -all +TLSv1.2 +TLSv1.3
SSLHonorCipherOrder     off
SSLCipherSuite          ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305

Caddy

‹host› {
	tls {
		protocols tls1.2 tls1.3
	}
}

Cloudflare

SSL/TLS → Edge Certificates → Minimum TLS Version → TLS 1.2.

Put this in the http block so it applies to every server block; a per-server ssl_protocols directive silently overrides it for that server only.
Set it in the main configuration, not in .htaccess — SSLProtocol is a server-context directive and .htaccess cannot change it.
Caddy already defaults to TLS 1.2 and 1.3; an explicit block is only needed to pin them.
This setting governs the connection between visitors and Cloudflare's edge only. It does not change what the origin server negotiates, and an origin that is reachable directly — by IP, or through any DNS record that is not proxied — still accepts what it accepted before. This scan measured the origin, so apply the server-side configuration as well.

Technical detail

‹host› negotiated ‹cipher›. ‹reason›

Suites in this class include RC4 (RFC 7465 prohibits it), export-grade suites (FREAK, Logjam), single DES, and anonymous or NULL suites that skip authentication or encryption entirely. There is no configuration in which one of these is the right choice.