A nameserver answers queries for domains that are not yours
What this check looks for
One of your nameservers will look up any domain on the internet for anybody who asks. That makes it a free amplifier for attacks on other people, and eventually gets its address blocked.
Why it matters
An open recursive server is used to bounce traffic at victims: a small forged query produces a large answer sent to the target's address. Your server absorbs the load and takes the blame, and once its address is on abuse lists, resolvers start ignoring it — which breaks your own domain.
When the check passes, your report says: “Nameservers answer only for the domains they serve”.
What it costs your score
When this check fails it removes 8 points from your DNS score, before the status, confidence and repeat multipliers are applied. DNS carries a weight of 10 in the overall score.
It shares the dns.health.exposure family ceiling of 25 points: however many findings that family produces, together they cannot remove more than that from DNS. One underlying problem showing up in several places is still one problem.
- Severity
- medium
- Default confidence
- confirmed
- Status when triggered
- warn
- Deduction
- 8 points
- Family cap
- dns.health.exposure · 25
- Category
- DNS
- Module
- Dns health
- Fix owned by
- dns host
- In the ruleset since
- 2026.09
How to fix it
Turn recursion off on your authoritative nameservers.
An open resolver is used to attack third parties and ends up blocked, which breaks your own domain.
Set
recursion no;in BIND, or leave PowerDNS Authoritative in its default non-recursive mode.If the same machine must also serve recursion to your own network, bind the recursive service to an internal address only, or restrict it with an ACL.
Apply the change on every authoritative nameserver.
How to confirm it worked
dig +norecurse @‹nameserver› A www.iana.org — expect no answer and no ra flag
A named slot like ‹domain› — and the braces left in the configuration below — is filled in with your own values when this rule appears on a report.
Remediation by platform
BIND: options { recursion no; allow-query { any; }; };
PowerDNS: (Authoritative is non-recursive by default — do not run Recursor on the same address)
Knot/NSD: authoritative only; no recursion is implementedTechnical detail
These nameservers answered a recursive query for ‹probed name›, a name in a zone they cannot be authoritative for: ‹server list›. RFC 5358 §3 recommends that an authoritative server offer no recursion at all, and that a recursive server serve only its own clients. The two roles should not share a listener; almost every server package separates them with a single directive.
Standards and references
Test this on your domain
Run the check that produces this finding, on its own, against any domain.
Other dns health checks
- A name has a CNAME alongside other records
- A glue record's address does not match the nameserver's own
- A nameserver inside the domain has no glue record
- A nameserver you delegate to does not answer for the zone
- The domain has fewer than two nameservers
- A nameserver name is an alias rather than a host
- The registry and the zone disagree about the nameservers
- All nameservers resolve to one address
- All nameservers sit in one network block
- A nameserver name has no address
- The delegation could not be checked
- Your nameservers are serving different versions of the zone